Abstract
The transport of discarded electronic and electrical appliances (e-waste) to developing regions has 15 received considerable attention, but it is difficult to assess the significance of this issue without a 16 quantitative understanding of the amounts involved. The main objective of this study is to track the 17 global transport of e-wastes by compiling and constraining existing estimates of the amount of e-waste 18 generated domestically in each country MGEN, exported from countries belonging to the Organization for 19
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) MEXP, and imported in countries outside of the OECD 20 MIMP. Reference year is 2005 and all estimates are given with an uncertainty range. Estimates of MGEN 21 obtained by apportioning a global total of ~35,000 kt (range 20,000-50,000 kt) based on a nation's gross 22 domestic product agree well with independent estimates of MGEN for individual countries. Import 23 estimates MIMP to the countries believed to be the major recipients of e-waste exports from the OECD 24 globally (China, India and five West African countries) suggests that ~5,000 kt (3,600 kt -7,300 kt) may 25 have been imported annually to these non-OECD countries alone, which represents ~23% (17% -34%) of 26 the amounts of e-waste generated domestically within the OECD. MEXP for each OECD country is then 27 estimated by applying this fraction of 23% to its MGEN. By allocating each country's MGEN, MIMP, MEXP and 28 MNET = MGEN + MIMP -MEXP, we can map the global generation and flows of e-waste from OECD to non-29 OECD countries. While significant uncertainties remain, we note that estimated import into seven non-30 OECD countries alone are often at the higher end of estimates of exports from OECD countries. 31
Introduction

34
Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) and e-waste are the two more frequently used terms 35 for discarded devices and appliances that use electricity. According to Robinson, 1 e-waste refers to 36 discarded electronic goods (e.g., computers, mobile telephones), whereas WEEE additionally includes 37 non-electronic appliances (e.g., refrigerators, air conditioning units, washing machines). A clear-cut 38 distinction between e-waste and WEEE is difficult, if nothing else because of the increasing use of 39 electronics (e.g., microprocessors) in electrical equipment. 1 By 2005, the United Nations Environmental 40
Program (UNEP) estimated that the volume of e-waste was anticipated to increase by a minimum of 3-41 5% per year, which is nearly three times faster than the growth of municipal waste.
42
The trade and transport of used electrical and electronic equipment (UEEE) and/or e-waste from 43 developed to developing regions has received considerable attention.e.g. 3, 4, 5 The debate is often 44 fuelled by the duality of the potential economic and environmental benefits versus the potential risks to 45 environmental and human health posed by discarded and exported EEE. Viewed in a positive light, it has 46 been argued that the international trade and donations of used electronic equipment facilitates an 47 opportunity to bridge the so-called "digital divide", i.e. the disparity between the adoption of 48 information and communications technology (ICT) in developed and developing regions. 6 Secondly, 49 export of UEEE and e-waste to less affluent regions also represents a reallocation of resources as 50 repairable equipment, spare parts, raw materials and valuable metals (e.g. Copper), which generate 51 substantial post-consumption economic activity. 7, 8, 9 Retrieval of metals from e-waste in developing 52 regions may also be environmentally beneficial as it reduces the need for primary extraction of metals 53 from mining ores 10 , while reuse of second-hand and refurbished EEE in developing countries has the 54 potential to extend the life-time of products by reducing the rate of turnover in comparison to 55 developed countries.
4 56 E-waste is among the most complex and persistent of any wastes generated, which makes 57 environmentally sound management labour intensive and therefore expensive in countries with high 58 labour costs. Environmental regulation and enforcement in developing countries with lower labour costs 59 is often too weak to assure environmentally sound management of e-waste. 11 Informal dismantling and  60 recycling activities, however, increase the propensity for environmental releases of many hazardous 61 substances from EEE 1, 12, 13 (e.g., metals [14] [15] [16] , halogenated flame retardants [17] [18] [19] , polychlorinated biphenyls 62 20, 21 ), relative to when the product is intact 4 or disposed in well managed waste streams. 10 The 63 transboundary movement of e-waste may even represent a significant vector for the (long-range) 64 transport of toxic contaminants embedded in these products, which thus far appears to have been 65 largely ignored in studies of global emissions, fate and transport of contaminants. 21 For example, it has 66 been estimated that the import of PBDEs via e-wastes into China exceeds domestic production of 67 brominated flame retardants by a factor of 3. Due to the lack of a universal definition of e-waste and WEEE, we will consider (total) e-waste or WEEE 97 as the sum of the ten categories reflected in the European WEEE Directive unless specified otherwise. 98 Table S1 in the Supporting Information lists these ten categories and examples of equipment and 99 products within each. These data may also serve as a reference to get an approximate idea about total 100
tonnage of e-waste that could be anticipated whenever the scope of studies referred to is restricted to 101 one or a few categories of e-waste alone. 102
Mass balance 103
The main objective was three-fold: (i) to estimate the amount of e-waste generated by 2 We explore the average of this estimate (35,000 kt per year) as our default for 136 the globally generated amount of e-waste, with 20,000 and 50,000 kt per year as our lower and upper 137 bound estimates, respectively. We note that this estimate is not universally accepted as Robinson 1 138 suggested that the global e-waste production is at the lower end of this range. 139
In order to distribute the global estimate to individual nations, we took advantage of the often tight 140 relationship observed between the generation of e-waste and key economic indicators, such as gross 141 domestic product (GDP) 1, 34 which has given rise to the notion that e-waste is the "effluent by the 142 affluent". 3 The tight relationship is exemplified in Figure S1 , which plots the total number of cell phone 143 subscriptions as a function of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), weighted for Purchasing Power Parity 144 (PPP), based on statistical data for the year 2005. 35 GDP (PPP) as of 2005 was used as a proxy for 145 distributing the UNEP estimate by country. 146
Imports and exports
147
A lack of reliable and relevant activity data, rooted in the often illicit nature of transboundary waste 148 flows, makes it virtually impossible to accurately quantify the amount of e-waste exported from the 149 OECD.
1 Such lack of knowledge may lead to significant underestimates of actual e-waste exports, and of 150 illegal exports in particular, if one chooses a forward approach. An inverse approach was therefore 151 selected, where data on national imports of e-waste to non-OECD countries (MIMP) are collected and 152 analyzed first. In the specific case of China for which more detailed data are available, the national 153 estimate is derived from constraining data on amounts treated in major e-waste areas along with data 154 on the number of workers involved in these regions and for China as a whole. The national import data 155 are in turn compared with data or estimates on e-waste exports for OECD countries. In the latter case, 156 export estimates (MEXP) are typically derived as 157
where fCOL is the fraction of the annual amount of e-waste generated which is collected for recycling, 159
while fEXP refers to the fraction collected for recycling which is exported to non-OECD countries rather 160 than handled domestically. Data on fCOL and fEXP were compiled from the literature. The fraction fCOL is a 161 key consideration and can vary substantially among different categories of e-waste, as initiatives to 162 promote collection and recycling are implemented over time. 163
Uncertainties and limitations 164
While our mass balance approach is deliberately simplistic, reflecting the lack of more accurate and 165 reliable data, it has the advantage of generating estimates for MGEN, MIMP and MEXP that can be 166 compared with independent estimates from the literature. quantitative budget for total import to non-OECD is 5,023 kt (3,642 kt -7,331 kt), which is 14.4 % (10.4% 318 -20.9%) of the default estimate for the global generation of e-waste or 23% (16.7% -33.5%) of the e-319 waste generated within the OECD alone. The latter estimates form the baseline for comparison with 320 export estimates. 321
Exports from OECD 322
Available estimates of transboundary exports of e-waste out of the OECD are highly variable and some 323 of these figures have a way of taking on a life of their own. 4 For example, two studies independently 324 claim that nearly 80% of all e-waste generated in developed countries is currently exported to 325 developing nations, 10, 86 both citing Hicks et al. 87 Hicks et al., in turn, quoted an extensively cited report, 326 published in 2002 by the Basel Action Network (BAN), in which it was claimed that 50 to 80% of the e-327 waste collected for recycling in the western USA is exported to Asia, of which 90% is destined for China.
3 328 Yet, the authors of the BAN report admit that nobody really knows the exact amounts of e-waste 329 exported and that these figures are based on informed industry sources. 3 It is also important to stress 330 that there is a significant difference between amounts generated and amounts collected for recycling. A 331 study on the management and fate of major fractions of consumer electronics and IT/communications 332 equipment in the US for the years 2003-2005 88 indicates that most of this e-waste was destined for 333 domestic landfills, while approximately 20% was collected for recycling (fCOL, see Equation 2). 89 If 334 combined with the BAN estimates for fraction exported (fEXP) above, these data suggest that 10% to 16% 335
of the e-waste generated annually in the US was exported with 5% -12.8% destined for Asia. This 336 estimate is in better agreement with a more rigorous material flow analysis of used computers alone in 337 USA for 2010 for which it was estimated that between 6% and 29% are exported abroad for reuse and 338 recycling. 90 The BAN estimate has also been questioned by the US International Trade Commission  91 and  339 is contradicted by a recent study which suggests that the amount of used electronics (TVs, computers, 340 mobile phones and monitors) exported abroad from the US to any other country by 2010 was 27 kt.
341
This represents 1.7% out of 1,600 kt of used electronics generated in 2010 -or only 3.1% of the amounts 342 collected. 92 Still, the same research group found that 78-81% of used laptops exported from the US in 343 2010 were sent to non-OECD countries with Asia as the main destination. 93 However, the authors admit 344 that approaches relying on trade data methodologies inevitably will tend to underestimate total 345 exports.
346
According to the European Environment Agency (EEA), between 8,000 and 10,000 kt of e-waste was 347 generated in the EU in 2008. By extrapolating German data, the EEA estimated that between 550 and 348 1,300 kt of UEEE / e-waste was exported out of the European Union the same year which corresponds to 349 between 5.5% and 16.3%. , it has been claimed that more than a third of the 354 Japanese e-waste is not accounted for.
355
While controversy and uncertainty are likely to remain significant on the issue of exports from OECD to 356 developing regions, these examples illustrate the notorious difficulties in assigning reliable export 357 estimates to non-OECD countries using "forward" approaches. Although the scope of our analysis is 358 restricted to the export from OECD to non-OECD countries, we reiterate that the assumption of uni-359 directional flows has been questioned by 28 as well as others 27 which 360 highlights that the "trade and traffic" is not merely about transport from "rich" to "poor" countries, but 361 that there are significant intra-regional movements. 28, 94 Adding to the difficulty of tracking flows is that 362 many destinations are merely transhipment points.e.g. 92, 93 For example, some of the e-waste imported 363 into China may arrive through Hong Kong, yet as much as 80% of selected household e-wastes (TVs,  364 washing machines, air conditioners, refrigerators and PCs) generated in Hong Kong may be exported.
365
Inferences about exports are sometimes made from analysis of formal trade data alone, while illicit 366 flows are unaccounted e.g. 28 and it may be questioned whether formal trade data are representative 367 for any flow of e-wastes. However, many of the import data for China and West Africa which are 368 compiled and discussed herein (3.2) provide strong support for the notion that most of these imports 369 originate from OECD countries, rather than being a result of intraregional flows within non-OECD 370 regions. As there are additional non-OECD countries implicated as importers of e-waste not accounted 371 for, the true exports from OECD to non-OECD regions could still be underestimated. 372
Global mass balance 373
Because of the large uncertainties in existing OECD export estimates, we assume that all OECD countries 374 export the same fraction of domestically generated e-waste amounts (i.e., default MEXP = 0.23MGEN, 375 range 0.17-0.34MGEN) (Section 3.3.4). A graphical representation of the final budget (default scenario) is 376 presented in Figure 1 . While it is estimated that OECD and non-OECD regions account for 62.4% and 377 37.6% of the total global generation of e-waste, respectively, our default estimate suggest that the net 378 amount (MNET) processed in the non-OECD region (51.9%) exceeds that within OECD (48.1%) because of 379 exports from the latter to the former region. The results in Fig 1 furthermore suggests that the amounts 380 generated in North America (24.3%) or EU countries members of the OECD (22.8%), are comparable 381 with the amounts generated in other non-OECD countries (23%). However, the amounts imported (or 382 exported) from other non-OECD countries remain unknown (Fig 1) . The largest export from OECD in 383 percentage of the total amounts generated worldwide is attributed to North America (5.6%), followed 384 by the European Union (5.2%), Asia (2.0%) and other OECD countries (1.5%), while the largest import is 385 estimated for China (10.3%), West Africa (2.8%) and India (1.3%). 386
As the import/export estimates are subject to uncertainties (Table 1) , the outcome depends on the 387 scenario selected. Under the minimum import scenario, OECD remains the dominant region for MNET 388 (52%), while both the default and maximum import scenarios indicate that MNET is higher within the 389 non-OECD region (Table S4) . Furthermore, the net amount of e-waste processed in the non-OECD region 390 (MNET) is dominated by domestic generation (MGEN) within that region, rather than by imports from 391 OECD countries, irrespective of scenario (see also Tables 1 and S4) . 392
In order to further visualize our results for the default scenario, we have prepared global maps for MGEN, 393
MIMP, MEXP and MNET in Figure S3 . In this study, the export estimates were derived using a simple inverse 394 approach based on import estimates alone in order to fulfil the mass balance. Our mass balance for 395 2005 therefore relies on the critical assumption that all imports (Fig S3b) are caused by exports from the 396 OECD-region alone (Fig S3c) , which implies that the export estimates from OECD are biased high in this 397 study in spite of e-waste imports to non-OECD possibly being underestimated. 398 
Research needs
